The Formation of Opinion Based Upon Legal Evidence by Weld, Harry P.
THE FORMATION OF OPINION BASED 
UPON LEGAL EVIDENCE 
N the trial of a case, as you know, the  members of the jury 
and the  judge have an opinion t o  form or, if you prefer, a 
judgment t o  reach. They must decide from the  evidence 
presented whether the defendant is guilty or is liable as 
charged. T h e  evidence is presented serially, one witness 
following another. Some parts of the testimony are more 
significant for the final result, some witnesses are more re- 
liable, some more persuasive than others. Presumably every 
portion of the evidence must, in effect, be sifted, weighed and 
evaluated as probable or improbable, as strong or weak, as 
true or false, and as for or against the  plea of the defendant. 
Somehow in the  end, if the evidence is conclusive, a judg- 
ment is formed with respect t o  the  guilt or to  the liability of 
the  defendant. 
How is such a judgment reached? How does the human 
organism function when i t  forms an opinion based upon 
evidentiary facts? The  answer is not easy t o  find, and the 
problem becomes more difficult when we consider tha t  legal 
procedure expects judgment t o  be suspended until all the  
evidence has been presented. By what trick of memory can 
the members of a jury retain all the  bits of evidence, every 
one with its own evaluation, in a trial that  may have lasted 
for days or even weeks, and then summon them for review 
and final judgment? 
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With the possible exception of Jeremy Bentham, the only 
jurist who appreciated and faced this problem was John 
Henry Wigmore, for many years dean of the law school a t  
Northwestern University, and the author of the monumental 
Treatise o n  Evidence, a book familiar to  every law-student in 
America and in England as well. He not only struggled with 
the problem, but he also found, as he thought, a solution. 
I n  1913 he presented this solution in a book entitled The  
Principler of Judicial  Proof. The book as a whole was in 
many ways remarkable, and I wish I had the time to pay it 
the tribute i t  deserves. The part, however, that concerns us 
is what Wigmore calls "The chart method of the analysis 
of mixed masses of evidence." It consists in the determina- 
tion of the probative value of every evidentiary fact, as i t  
is presented, with respect to  the question at issue-not t o  the 
final result which would be the proof. These values are ex- 
pressed in a series of symbols which he invented, and these 
symbols are then placed in a chart or diagram so that when 
the chart is finished all of the evidence which had been pre- 
sented serially is now presented sirnultaneousIy. Whereupon 
the thinker may proceed t o  find the proof which is in the 
chart, provided only that the evidence is conclusive. 
I n  so far as I know this method has never received more 
than academic acceptance. Wigmore felt the failure and in 
1931 he published a second edition in which he tried to  bring 
the salient points of the method into bolder relief. Still it 
failed, and in 1937 a third edition with a slight change in 
title appeared; and this was the last, for in 1943 his brilliant 
career came to  a tragic end. For more than twenty-five 
years he had struggled with the problem which he regarded 
as a serious one, and its solution as essential to a higher order 
of justice. Why did he fail? 
I venture t o  suggest that the failure lay in his mistaken 
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understanding of the psychological nature of the thinking 
processes. His probIem was conceived from the point of view 
of formal logic, and he confused the actual process of think- 
ing with the canons of logic which are applied to the results 
of our thinking, not t o  the thinking itself. In other words he 
supposed that we think in the way that a logical analysis 
tests the outcome of our thinking, and not as in practice we 
actually think. 
At any rate i t  was from this consideration that a dozen 
years ago I began a series of experiments in the hope of 
discovering, in part a t  least, just what the individual does 
when he tries t o  reach a judgment from evidentiary facts. 
And it is the results of the first four of these experiments 
that I propose t o  present to  you today. The exposition is not 
easy, and I have thought i t  would save me much trouble and 
a t  the same time interest you, if I should take you through 
the motions of an experiment-allow you to  see for your- 
seIves how you reach decisions. Then when we have finished 
I shall summarize the kind of thinking you have been doing 
by showing you some results of some actual experiments 
made elsewhere. 
I propose to  read to you the report of the evidence in the 
Thomas Hoag Case-a famous trial for bigamy held in the 
court of Oyer and Terminer in New York City on June 22, 
1804. I have divided the evidence into eleven installments, 
t o  which I have added two others-installment I, the indict- 
ment, and installment XIII, the verdict reached by the jury 
in the actual trial, These latter are of course nor evidence; 
but we wanted to  see what effect if any they might have upon 
the judgments. 
As I read I shaIl pause a t  the end of every installment, and 
I shall ask you at that point t o  make your judgment of the 
relative guilt or innocence of the defendant. You may do this 
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in terms of the following nine-point scale: r, certainty of 
innocence; 2, strong belief in innocence; 3,  fair belief in inno- 
cence; 4, slight belief in innocence; 5 ,  doubtful; 6, slight 
belief in guilt; 7, fair belief in guilt; 8, strong belief in guilt; 
9, certainty of guilt. To be more explicit, if a t  the end of an 
installment you are certain of guilt your judgment will be g. 
If you have a slight belief in guilt, it will be 6, if doubtful, 5. 
If certain of innocence i t  will be I, and so on. If you have 
pencil and paper, you may find i t  amusing to  record your 
judgments in order. That  is all that I ask you to  do. Will 
you do it ? 
Your silence seems to  indicate your consent. I proceed, 
therefore, with the report of this amazing case? 
I .  Indictment. The prisoner was indicted for that whereas 
Thomas Hoag, late of Haverstraw, in the county of Rockland, 
laborer, otherwise called Joseph Parker, now of the city of 
New York, cartman, on the 8th of May, 1797, a t  the said city 
of New York, was lawfully married to Susan Faesch, and the 
said Susan then and there had for a wife? and the said Thomas, 
alias, etc., afterwards, t o  wit, on the 35th day of December, 
1800, a t  the county of Rockland, his said wife being then in 
full life, feloniously did marry, and to wife did take, one Ca- 
therine Secor, etc. T o  this, the prisoner pleaded not guilty. 
Judgment. 
II. Prorecution. On the part of the prosecution, Benjamin 
Coe testified: That  he was one of the judges of the court of 
common pleas in the county of Rockland; that he well knew 
the prisoner a t  the bar; that  he came to Rockland in the be- 
ginning of September, in the year 1800, and there passed by 
the name of Thomas Hoag; that the prisoner worked for wit- 
ness about a month, during which time he ate daily a t  wit- 
ness' table, and he of course saw him daily; that on the 25th 
day of December, 1800, witness married the prisoner to one 
Catherine Secor; that  witness is confident of the time, because 
he recollected that  on that veryday one of his own children was 
christened; that during all the time the prisoner remained in 
Rockland county witness saw him continually; he was there- 
fore as much satisfied that  the prisoner was Thomas Hoag as 
that  he himself was Benjamin Coe. Judgntent. 
I I I .  Prosecution. John Knapp testified, that he knew the 
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prisoner in 1800 and 1801; he was then in Rockland county, 
and passed by the name of Thomas Hoag; t h a t  he saw him 
constantly for five months, during the  time the prisoner was 
a t  Rockland: tha t  he was a t  the orisoner5s weddine: t h a t  
", 
Hoag had a scar under his foot; the  way tha t  witness knew it, 
was that  he and Hoag were leaping together, and witness 
outleaped Hoag, upon which the latter remarked that  he could 
not  leap as well now as formerly, in consequence of a wound in 
his foot by treading on a drawing knife; tha t  Hoag then pulled 
off his shoe and showed witness the scar under his foot, oc- 
casioned by  t h a t  wound; the  scar was very perceptible. 
Witness was confident prisoner a t  the  bar was Thomas Hoag. 
Catherine Conklin (formerly Catherine Secor) testified, that  
she became acquainted with prisoner in the beginning of S e p  
tember, 1800, when he came t o  Rockland; he  then passed by  
the name of Thomas Hoag; that  witness saw him constantly; 
that  prisoner, shortly after their acquaintance, paid his ad- 
dresses t o  her, and finally, on the 25th of December, married 
her; that  he lived with her till the latter end of March, 1801, 
when he left her: tha t  she did not see him aeain until two vears 
after; that  on the  morning of his leaving her, he appeared de- 
sirous of communicating something to her of importance but 
was dissuaded from it by a person who was with him and who 
passed for his brother; tha t  Hoag, until his departure, was a 
kind, attentive and affectionate husband; tha t  she was as well 
convinced as she could possibly be of anything in this world, 
tha t  the prisoner a t  the bar was the person who married her 
by the name of Thomas Hoag; that  she then thought him 
and still thinks him the handsomest man she ever saw. Jzdg- 
ma?zt. 
I t :  Defense. Joseph Chadwick, who testified, that  he had 
been acquainted with rhe prisoner, Joseph Parker, a number 
of years; tha t  witness resides in rhis city, is a rigger by trade; 
tha t  the prisoner worked in the employ of the witness a con- 
siderable time as a rigger; that  prisoner began t o  work for 
witness in September, 1799, and continued t o  work for him 
till the spring of 1801; t h a t  during t h a t  period he saw him 
constantly; that  i t  appeared from witness' books that  Parker 
received money from witness, for work which he had per- 
formed on the following days, viz.: on the 6th of October, and 
6th and 13th December, 1800; on the gth, 16, and 28th Feb- 
ruary, and 11th March, 1801; t h a t  Parker lived from May, 
1800, till sometime in April, 1801, in a house in the city of 
New York belonging to Capt. Pelor; that  during that  period, 
and since, witness has been well acquainted with the prisoner, 
Jz~dgment. 
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7, Defense. Isaac Ryckman testified, that  he was an inhab- 
itant of the city of New York: that  he was well acquainted 
with Joseph Parker, the prisoner a t  the bar, and had known 
him a number of years; that witness and Parker were jointly 
engaged in the latter part of the year 1800, in loading a vessel 
for Capt. Tredwell, of New York; that  they began to work on 
the 20th day of December, 1800, and were employed the 
greater part of the month of January, 1801, in the loading of 
thevessel; that during that time the witness and Parker worked 
together daily; the witness recollected well that  they worked 
together on the 25th day of December, 1800; he remem- 
bered it because he never worked on Christmas day, before or 
since; he knew it was in the year 1800, because he knew that  
Parker lived, that year, in a house belonging to Capt. Pelor, 
and he remembered their borrowing a screw for the purpose 
of packing cotton into the hold of the vessel they were a t  
work at, from a Mrs. Mitchell, who lived next door to Parker; 
that witness was one of the city watch, and that  Parker was 
also a t  that time upon the watch; and that witness had served 
with him from that time to  the present day, upon the watch, 
and never recollected missing him any time during that  
period from the city. 
Aspinwall Cornwall testified, that he lived in Rutger street, 
and had lived there a number of years; that  he kept a grocery 
store; that he knew Parker, the prisoner a t  the bar, in 1800 
and 1801; that Parker then lived in Capt. Pelor's house; 
that  he lived only one year in Pelor's house; that  Parker, 
while he lived there, traded with witness; that  witness rec- 
ollected once missing Parker for a week, and, inquiring, 
found he had been a t  work on Staten Island, on board one 
of the United States frigates; that, excepting that time, he 
never knew him to be absent from his family, but saw him 
constantly. judgment. 
VI .  Deje~ise. Elizabeth Mitchell testified, that she knew Par- 
ker, the prisoner a t  the bar, well; that in the years 1800 and 1801 
Parker lived in a house adjoining to one in which witness lived; 
that  the house Parker lived in belonged to Capt. Pelor; that 
witness was in habits of intimacy with Parker's family, and 
visited them constantly; that  Parker being one of the city 
watch, she used to hear him rap with his stick a t  the door, to 
awaken his family, upon his return from the watch in the 
morning; that  she also remembered, perfectly tvelI, Parker's 
borrowing a screw from her on Christmas day, in 1800; she 
offered him some spirits to drink, but he preferred wine, which 
she got for him; the circumstance of her lending the screw 
to him she was the more positive of, froin recollecting, also, 
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that  i t  was broken by Parker in using it; that  Parker never 
lived more than one year in Capt. Pelor's house, and from that  
time to the present day, witness had been on the same 
terms of intimacy with Parker's family; she therefore con- 
sidered i t  as almost impossible that  Parker could have been 
absent from town, any time, without her knowing it; and 
she never knew him to be absent more than one week, while 
he lived a t  Pelor's house. Jz~dgment. 
YII .  Dejelzse. James Redding testified, that  he had lived in 
the city a number of years; that  he had known Parker, the 
prisoner a t  the bar, from his infancy; that  Parker was born at  
Rye, in Westchester county; tha t  Parker, in the year 1800, 
lived in Capt. Pelor's house; that  witness saw him then con- 
stantly, and never knew him during tha t  time to be absent 
from town, during any length of time; that witness particular- 
ly remembered that, sometime in the beginning of the month 
of January, 1801, while Parker lived in Capt. Pelor's house, 
witness assisted Parker in killing a hog. 
Lewis Osborne testified, that  he had been acquainted with 
Parker, the prisoner a t  the bar, for the last four years; that  
witness had been one of the city watch: that  from June, 180% 
to May, 1801, Parker served upon the watch with witness; 
that, a t  first, Parker served as a substitute; that  witness re- 
membered that  Parker, a few days after Christmas, in 1800, 
was placed upon the roll of the regular watch, in the place of 
one Ransom, who was taken sick; witness was certain i t  was 
in the period above mentioned, because that  was the only 
time witness ever served upon the match; that  during the 
above period, witness and Parker were stationed together, 
while on the watch, a t  the same post; witness was certain that 
Parker, the prisoner a t  the bar, was the person with whom he 
had served upon thewatch, and was confident that  during that 
time Parker was never absent from the watch, more than a 
week, at  any one time. Judgment. 
YI I I ,  Prosecution. Moses Anderson testified, tha t  he had 
lived a t  Haverstra~v, Rockland county; that he had lived 
there since the year 1791; that he knew the prisoner at  the 
bar well; that he came to the house of thewitness in the begin- 
ning of September, 1800; that  he then passed by the name of 
Thomas Hoag; tliat he worked for the witness eight or ten 
days; tha t  from that  time till the 25th of December, prisoner 
passed almost every Sunday a t  witness's house, that during 
prisoner's stay in Rockland countywitness saw him constantly; 
and if prisoner was the person alluded to, he had a scar on his 
forehead, which he told witness was occasioned by the kick 
of a horse; he had also a small mark on his neck (those marks 
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the  prisoner had); he  had also a scar under his foot, between 
the heel and ball of the foot, occasioned, as he told witness, by  
treading on a drawing knife; that that Jcar was easy to  be seen; 
tha t  his speech was remarkable, his voice being effeminate; 
that  he spoke quick and lisped a little (these pecuIiarities were 
observable in prisoner's speech); that  prisoner supped a t  wit- 
ness's house on the night of his marriage in December, 1800; 
t h a t  witness had not seen prisoner until this day, since pris- 
oner left Rockland, which was between three and four years 
ago; that  witness was perfectly satisfied in his own mind t h a t  
prisoner was Thomas Hoag. 
Lavina Anderson testified, that  she knew prisoner a t  the  
bar; his name was Thomas Hoag; that  in September, 1800, he 
came t o  witness's house in Rockland county, and worked for 
her husband eight or ten days, then worked for Judge Suffrein; 
every Saturday night until the prisoner was married, he and a 
person who passed for his brother, came t o  witness's house and 
stayed till Monday morning; that  witness washed for him; 
there was n o  mark upon his linen; that  prisoner, if he is 
Thomas Hoag, has a scar upon his forehead, and one also under 
his foot; was certain of the  mark under his foot, because she 
recollected tha t  the person who passed as his brother, hav- 
ing cut himself severely with a scythe, and complaining very 
much of the pain, Thomas Hoag told him he had been much 
worse wounded and then showed t h e  scar under his foot. Wit- 
ness also testified, that  about a year ago, after a suit had been 
brought in the justices' court in Netv York, wherein the  iden- 
t i ty  of the prisoner's person came in question, witness was in  
town, and having heard a great deal said on the  subject, she 
was determined to see him and judge for herself; that  accord- 
ingly she went t o  prisoner's house, but he was not a t  home; 
she then went to  the place where she was informed he stood 
with his cart; t h a t  she there saw him lying on his cart with 
his head on his hand: that  in that  situation she instantlv 
knew him; tha t  she spoke t o  him and when he answered she 
immediately recognized his voice; tha t  i t  was very singular, 
shrill, thick, hurried, and something of a lisp; tha t  Hoag had 
also a habit of shrugging up his shoulders when he spoke, 
which she aIso observed in the ~risoner:  tha t  ~r i soner  said he  
had been told she was coming t o  see him, and i t  was surprising 
people could be so deceived, and asked witness if she thought 
he  was the man, to  which witness replied tha t  she thought he 
was, but  would be more certain if she looked a t  his fore- 
head; that  she accordingly lifted up his hat, and saw the  scar 
upon his forehead, which she had often before seen; that  pris- 
oner then told her it was occasioned by t h e  kick of a horse. 
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Witness added tha t  i t  was impossible she could be mistaken- 
prisoner was Thomas Hoag. Judg?next. 
IX. Proseczltion. Margaret Secor testified, that  about four 
years ago she lived a t  Rockland with her father, Moses Ander- 
son; tha t  prisoner a t  the bar, Thomas Hoag, came t o  this 
house in September, 1800; that  he remained in Rockland fiveor 
six months; tha t  he had a scar on his forehead, that  Koag used 
t o  come every Saturday night to  her father's t o  pass Sunday 
with them; tha t  she used to comb and tie his hair every Sun- 
day, and thus saw the scar; that  witness married about two 
years ago, and came immediately t o  live in the city of New 
York; that  after she had been in town a fortnight, she was one 
day standing a t  her door, when she heard a cartman speaking 
to his horse; that  she immediately recognized the voice to  be 
tha t  of Thomas I-Ioag, and upon looking a t  him, saw the 
prisoner a t  the bar, and instantly knew him; tha t  as he passed 
her he smiled and said, "How d'ye do, cousin?" that  the next 
day he came t o  her house and asked her how she knew he was 
the man; witness replied she could tell better if he would let 
her look a t  his head; rhat accordingly she looked and saw a 
scar upon his forehead, which she hadoftenremarked upon the 
head of Hoag. Witness added that  she was confident prisoner 
was the person who passed a t  Rockland as Thomas Hoag. 
James Secor testified, that  he knew Hoag in Rockland, and 
had repeatedly seen him there; tha t  Hoag had a remarkable 
scar on his forehead. and when ~ r i s o n e r  was a t  witness's 
house, he saw on his head the scar that  his wife had described. 
Nicholas W. Conklin testified, thar  he lived in Rockland 
county; that  he knew the prisoner a t  the bar; that  his name 
was Thomas Hoag; t h a t  he could not be mistaken; that  Hoag 
had worked a considerable time for him; tha t  during that  time 
he had eaten a t  witness's table; that  Hoag being a stranger, 
and witness understanding that  he was paying addresses to  
Catherine Secor, witness took a good deal of notice of him; 
thought him a clever fellow; saw a great deal of him; lived in a 
house belonging t o  witness. When witness saw prisoner a t  this 
place, he knew him instantly; his gait, his smile, which is a 
very peculiar one, his very look was that  of Thomas Hoag. 
Witness endeavored, but  in vain, t o  find some difference in 
appearance between the prisoner and Hoag; he was satisfied in 
his mind tha t  he is the  same person. Hoag, he thought, was 
about twenty-eight or thirty years of age; he thought Hoag 
had a small scar on his neck. 
Michael Burke testified, tha t  he saw prisoner several times 
a t  Haverstravr; before and after his marriage in  December, 
1800; t h a t  he was as well satisfied as  he could be of anything, 
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that prisoner was the same person he knew in Haverstraw, 
that  about two years ago he met the prisoner in the Bowery, 
at  the time of the Harlem races; prisoner spoke to witness, 
and said, "Am I not a relation of yours?" Witness replied, 
"I don't know." Prisoner said, "I am; I married Katy Secor." 
Abraham Wendell testified, that he knew one Thomas Hoag 
in the latter end of the year 1800; he was then inHaverstraw; 
that  he had been very intimate with him, and knew him as 
well as he knew any man; that  he had worked with him, had 
breakfasted, dined, and supped with him, and many a time 
had been a t  frolics with him, and that  the prisoner a t  the bar 
was the same man; that he had no doubt whatever about it; 
that witness was as confident prisoner is the person, as he was 
of his own existence. 
Sarah Conklin testified, that she lives in Haverstraw; tha t  
in September, 1800, a person calling himself Thomas Hoag 
was a t  witness's house, was very intimate there, used to call 
her aunt; is sure prisoner is the same person; never can be- 
lieve two persons could look SO much alike; would know Hoag 
from among a hundred people by his voice; Prisoner must be 
Thomas Hoag; had not seen prisoner since he left Haverstraw 
till the present day. 
Gabriel Conklin testified, that he lived in Haverstraw; that  
he knew Thomas Hoag; that was a t  witness's house in Sep- 
tember, 1800, and often afterwards; prisoner is the same per- 
son, unless there can be two persons so much alike as not t o  
be distinguished from each other; prisoner must be Thomas 
Hoag; Thomas Hoag had a scar on his forehead and a small 
scar just above his lip, and prisoner had also these marks. 
Judgment. 
X. Defenense. James Juquar testified that  he had known Jo- 
seph Parker, the prisoner at  the bar, for seven years past; that 
he had been intimate with him at  that  time; that they had 
both worked together as riggers until Parker became a cart- 
man; knew Parker when he lived in Capt. Pelor's house; never 
knew him absent from the city during this rime,for a day, ex- 
cept when he was working on board one of the United States 
frigates, about a week a t  Staten Island. In the year 1799, pris- 
oner hurt himself on board the Adams frigate, and then went 
to his father's in Westchester county and was absent near a 
month; he was very ill when he left town; witness went with 
him, and brought him back again, before he was quite re- 
covered; recollects Parker and some other company passing 
Christmas eve a t  witness's house the year that  Parker lived in 
Capt. Pelor's house, which was in 1800. 
Susannah WendelI testified, that  she had known prisoner 
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for six years past; that he married witness's daughter; knew 
him when he lived in Capt. Pelor's house. Parker's wife was 
then ill, and witness had occasion frequently to visit her; saw 
prisoner there almost daily; Prisoner, excepting the time when 
he was sick and went to his father's in Westchester, has never 
been absent from the city more than one week since his mar- 
riage with witness's daughter. Judgnzent. 
X I .  Defense, Here i t  was agreed between the attorney-gener- 
a1 and the counsel for prisoner, that the prisoner shouId ex- 
hibit his foot to the jury, in order that  they mighr see wheth- 
er there was that scar which had been spoken of in such 
positive terms by several of the witnesses on the part of the 
people. Upon exhibiting his foot, not the least mark or scar 
could be seen on either of them3 Judgnzeat. 
X I I .  Defense. I n  further confirmation of prisoner's inno- 
cence, there was adduced on his behalf one more witness: 
Magnus Beekman, who testified, that  he was captain of the 
city watch of the second district; tha t  he was well acquainted 
with the prisoner, Joseph Parker; that  he, Parker, had been 
for many years a watchman, and had done duty constantly 
on the watch; that  witness recurring to his books, where he 
keeps a register of the watchmen and of their times of service, 
found tha t  prisoner, Joseph Parker, was regularly upon duty 
as a watchman during the months of October, November, and 
December, 1800, and January and February, 1801, and par- 
ticularly that he was upon duty the 26th of December, 1800. 
Judgment. 
X I I I .  Verdict. The jury, without retiring from the bar, 
found a verdict of not guilty. Judgment. 
I n  order that you may compare your own judgments with 
those of persons (or subjects [SJ] as they are technically 
called) in an actual experiment I shall show you a Table and 
a Graph which show the distribution of judgments of 50 
subjects for every installment. 
Since the steps in our scale are probably not equal, we 
have taken the median value as representing the central 
tendency, and the quartile deviation on each side of the 
median as representing the variation. 
An analysis in detail of the first experiment by reference 
t o  Table I and Fig. I will make them easily under~tandable.~ 
The first vertical column contains the distribution of judg- 
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TABLE I 
THE DISTRTBUTION OF JUDGMENTS IN EXPERIMENT I 
Scale Installments of evidence 
val- 
ues I I1 I11 IV V V I  V I I  
g 1  4 1 1 1  
8 4 1 z r o b z 1  
7 6 1 5 1 6 7 5 2  
6 2 2 1 0  7 1 1  5  5  7  
5 15 9  6 19 21 17 10 
4  1 4 10 9  15 
3 1 I 4 33 f 4  
2 1 2 2 3  
I  I 1 1  
VIII 
4  
5 
7  
I0 
20 
2 
I 
I 
The central black line represents the median value of all the judgments for each in- 
stallment. Tlie width of the figure represents the quartiIe deviation above and be- 
Iow the median. The stippled portion shows the effect of the  evidence for the  pros- 
ecution; the barred portion tha t  for the defense. 
ments for Installment I (reading of the indictment). One 
S was convinced of guilt, qSs had strong belief in guilt, 6 a 
fair belief in guilt, 22 a slight belief in guilt, r 5 were in doubt, 
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one had a slight belief and one a fair belief in innocence. 
The median is 5.9 which means roughly that the group as a 
whole with an average quartile deviation of 0.60 were led, 
merely by the indictment, to  report a slight feeling of guilt. 
The  second column gives the distribution of judgments 
following the testimony of the first witness for the prosecu- 
tion (a common-pleas judge who had known Thomas Hoag 
who had married Hoag to  Catherine Secor, and 
who was certain of his identification of the defendant). The 
distribution has changed significantly. Only 9 Ss, 18%, 
maintain doubt; all the rest are more or less certain of guilt. 
The third installment also for the prosecution (the important 
witness being Catherine Secor, who married Hoag and was 
sure of her identification) changed the distribution in the 
direction of certainty of guilt although i t  had little effect on 
the median. 
The next installment (IV) was the beginning of the testi- 
mony for the defense. It consisted in the testimony of Joseph 
Chadwick (who had known the defendent under the name of 
Joseph Parker and who testified that the accused had been 
in his employ in New York City during the time that the 
witness had known him). The distribution is in the direction 
of doubt. The next installment (V) carried the median t o  a 
point slightly below doubt and the next two installments, 
VI and VII, still further in the direction of innocence. Here, 
14% of the Ss still have a slight belief in innocence; one is 
certain of innocence. 
Installments VIII and IX contain further evidence for the 
prosecution. The former had more effect upon the change in 
distribution than any testimony presented up to this time. 
Two witnesses testified to  certain scars and to  the existence 
of a mark on the neck of Thomas Hoag; one of these scars 
and the mark on the neck were visible on the prisoner. (The 
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other scar, said t o  be visible on the bottom of Hoag's foot, 
played an important part in the case later on.) One of the 
witnesses also testified to  peculiarities in Hoag's voice which 
were also found in the prisoner. The general effect of this 
testimony was to  increase belief in the defendent's guilt al- 
though 40% of the Ss were in doubt. Installment IX con- 
tained testimony that  corroborated statements made in In- 
stallment VIII, and also statements of witnesses that  they 
recognized Hoag in New York City. Now 40% of the Ss  were 
either convinced or had a strong belief in guilt, and the 
doubtful cases decreased from 40% t o  14%. 
Then followed more testimony for the defense, InstalI- 
ment X contained nothing new by way of evidence but had 
the effect of overcoming the evidence of installment IX and 
creating greater confusion in the minds of the jurors. The 
deviation from the median a t  this point was 1.7 which was 
the largest variation found in this experiment. 
With Installment XI comes the most dramatic incident 
of the trial. Since a number of witnesses for the prosecution 
had testified to  the presence of a scar on the foot of Thomas 
Hoag, it was agreed by the attorney-general and the counsel 
for the prisoner to  exhibit the foot to  the jury. When this was 
done no scar or any mark was visible. The effect was remark- 
able, as 60% of the Ss now have a t  least a fair belief in the 
prisoner's innocence; 32% are, however, still doubtful, The 
final evidence for the defense was that of a witness who from 
his records showed that Joseph Parker had performed his 
duty as watchman during the month of December 1800, and 
particularly on the 26th of- December. Now 78% of the Ss 
have a t  least a fair belief in his innocence; only 8% are 
doubtful. 
At this point the verdict of the jury in the actual trial was 
read and judgments were recorded to see whether the decision 
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of the  jury had any effect. The  results showed tha t  certainty 
of innocence was increased. 
T h e  fact that  the  median changes its direction as the  evi- 
dence changes from prosecution t o  defense, or vice versa, led 
us t o  ask whether the  final result might not have been in- 
fluenced by the order in which the  testimony was given. I n  
the  second experiment therefore we gave the  first three in- 
stallments as in the first experiment and then followed tha t  
with all of the  testimony for the defense including instalIment 
XI. Then followed the remaining testimony for the  prosecu- 
tion. A glance a t  Fig. 2 will show tha t  in so far as the first 
six installments are concerned the  result is about the  same as 
in Fig. I. The  continuation of the  testimony for the  defense, 
however, carried the  judgments down t o  a median of 2.4 
(a fairly strong belief in innocence). T h e  remaining testimony 
for the prosecution then changed the median judgment t o  
doubt. 
I n  a third experiment (Fig. 3) all of the testimony for the  
prosecution was first given and then all of the  testimony for 
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the defense. The chart shows that at  the end of the testimony 
for the prosecution the median was 7.89, a strong belief in 
guilt; but as the testimony for the defense accumulated, the 
median judgment dropped to doubt but with wide variation 
and then a t  the end reached a point of 2.3-a strong belief 
in innocence. 
In  experiment 4 all of the testimony for the defense except 
the showing of the foot to the jury was given first, then all 
of the testimony for the prosecution, then the foot was 
shown. When the testimony was given in this order its great- 
est effect for the defense was a median of 3.33, but install- 
ments X and XII, still for the defense, actually raised the 
median by a small amount. The effect of the testimony for 
the prosecution was to raise the median to  7.77-a strong 
belief in guilt. Then with the showing of the foot the median 
dropped to  3.5-a strong belief in innocence. The  sIight rise 
in the upper quartile a t  installment VII in Fig. 3, and a simi- 
lar rise in Fig. 4 a t  instaIlment XI1 were the result in both 
cases of two judgments which are contrary to what the evi- 
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dence would lead us to  expect, and which we are unable to 
explain. 
The general result of the difference in the order in which 
the testimony was presented was to  change the final judg- 
ment from a relatively strong belief in innocence (Figs. r and 
3) to a fair belief in innocence (Fig. 4), or to  doubt (Fig. 2 ) .  
A study of all of the tables and figures will also show: (I) 
That  the mere indictment created a slight tendency to regard 
the defendent as guilty, ( 2 )  That the direction of the mass 
tendency as represented by the median is in general a func- 
tion of the testimony, i.e. i t  tends to rise with the testimony 
for the prosecution and to  fall with that of the defense. (3) 
That as evidence of a particular kind accumulates the central 
tendency continues to move in one direction but by relatively 
smaller steps. In other words there is a law of diminishing 
returns which, however, may be cut across by a particularly 
strong bit of testimony. (4) That a particular bit of evidence 
occurring with other evidence of the same kind is more effec- 
tive in some orders than in others or, in other words, the 
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effectiveness of the same testimony depends in part upon its 
ordinal place. For example, the effect of Installment I11 in 
all four experiments is almost exactly the same; namely, a 
slight rise above I1 which it always follows; but the  effect of 
Installment I1 in the first three experiments where it followed 
the indictment was never more than a single step, whereas 
in Experiment 4 where it followed six instaIlments for the 
defense it changed the judgment by three steps. Further- 
more, Installment IV  was very effective in the first three 
experiments and had practically no effect in the fourth ex- 
periment; Installment XI was least effective near the end of 
all the testimony for the defense as in Experiments 2 and 3 
and most effective after the  testimony for the prosecution as 
in Experiments r and 4. In  the case of this installment, how- 
ever, the effect of the testimony was partially enhanced by 
a change in the testimony from prosecution to  defense and 
was decreased by the limits of the scale, i.e., in Experiment 
2 the median of the preceding judgment was 3.43; the judg- 
ment of XI could not therefore have differed more than 
2.43 steps. 
Taking the four experiments together we have a total of 
178 Ss who have participated in t he  experiments, and 2136 
judgments. These judgments were not evenly distributed 
over the nine-point scale. If they had been we should have 
had 237 judgments or 11% for each point. The actual dis- 
tribution was as follows; judgment 5 (doubt), 24%; 9 (con- 
viction of guilt), 5%; I (conviction of innocence), 2%; all 
the others ranged from 1-o%-13%, i.e. they approximated 
cIosely to  the average. The larger proportion of doubtful 
judgments is, in view of the  conflicting nature of the evidence, 
not surprising. The small proportion a t  the extremes of the 
scale reflects the indecisiveness of the testimony and an atti- 
tude of caution on the part of many individuals. As regards 
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the former there was no one bit of evidence which all indi- 
viduals regarded as incontestable, and consequently many 
individuals never reached the point of certainty, they could 
< c 
never say there is no other solution." 
Let us turn now t o  Table I1 which shows the  judgments of 
12 different individuals. These are taken from Experiment 4 
as representative of the differences among individuals which 
are found in all of our experiments. The  judgments of each of 
these Ss are represented in the  tabIe by the  first 12 letters of 
the alphabet. 
A, j, and L maintain doubt until the beginning of the  
evidence for the  prosecution. A and J, however, as they after- 
wards admitted, did not in the beginning follow instructions. 
N o  matter what the evidence, they felt that  they should 
maintain the  attitude of doubt until all of the evidence was 
in. Neither was able however t o  maintain this attitude until 
the  end. J, at  the beginning of the evidence for the prosecu- 
tion decided that  the  case was one of mistaken identity and 
all subsequent evidence failed t o  do more than t o  change his 
certainty of innocence. L was honestly doubtful but with a 
slight belief in guilt. This feeling was heightened by the evi- 
dence for the  prosecution until L became certain of guilt. 
For A and j the absence of the  scar on the bottom of the  
foot led them t o  the judgment of innocence whereas for L it 
only decreased the  certainty of guilt. 
B, D, E, F, G, I, and K are all more or less gradually 
moved toward belief in innocence by the cumulative testi- 
mony for the  defense. All move toward guilt as the testimony 
for the  prosecution begins, and all except K had either a 
strong or definite belief in the guilt of the  prisoner before the 
foot was shown. K was ~ a r t i a l l ~  convinced of innocence dur- 
ing the last of the  evidence for t h e  prosecution because it 
seemed contradictory. 
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TABLE II 
THE JUDGMENTS OF 12 SS IN EXPERI~IENT 4
Subjects 
Installments 
ofevidence A B C D E F G H I J I< L 
I 5 9 8 5 5 5 6 7 7 5 5 5  
IV 5 5 8 4 6 5 5 5 7 5 5 6  
v 5 4 7 3 4 3 5 7 5 5 4 6  
VI 5 3 7 2 2 3 4 4 3 5 3 5  
VI I  5 3 7 2 2 3 4 3 3 5 3 5  
X 5 3 6 4 2 2 3 6 2 5 3 6  
XI1 5 2 6 4 2 2 3 6 2 4 3 6  
I1 5 5 8 7 2 3 6 7 5 4 5 7  
I11 5 7 8 8 3 5 7 8 7 3 5 8  
VIII 5 8 8 8 5 7 S 8 7 3 7 9  
IX 7 9 5 9 8 8 8 8 8 4 4 9  
XI 2 1 6 5 2 5 5 2 4 1 4 7  
XI11 1 1 -  5 2 2 1 1 3 1 2 7  
C, however, was so convinced of guilt by the indictment 
alone that in subsequent judgments he never got below 6. 
All testimony for the defense merely decreased his certainty 
of guilt. H was in many respects similar to C. He, however, 
considered the evidence for the defense as conflicting and 
this led him to believe that  the prisoner might be guilty. 
This belief was strengthened by the testimony for the prose- 
cution. 
A comparison of the horizontal line at  judgment IX and 
the same judgments a t  installment XI, when the foot was 
shown to the jury, is instructive. At IX a11 but two of the 
12 Ss were fairly or strongly convinced of guilt. With the 
showing of the foot, four changed their judgments to  inno- 
cence, three changed to  doubt, two changed to  less certainty 
cf guilt, one changed to  only slight belief in innocence. It is 
clear that By E, and H are easily influenced by their previous 
judgments, and D, F, G, and I are conservative in their 
judgments moving a step at a time or not a t  all with succes- 
sive installments and ending in doubt. 
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W-e may summarize the individual differences by saying 
that  the  individuals themselves reveal different trends or 
determinations in their evaluation of the facts. They are four 
in number and any single individual may have two or more 
of them a t  any one time but in different degree. There is first 
in a few individuals a pre-determination, an attitude of 
doubt, which is assumed a t  t h e  beginning and maintained as 
Iong as possible; this attitude may be characterized as a rule 
tha t  one should not reach a judgment until he hears all of 
the  evidence. Secondly, there is a tendency revealed by some 
Ss t o  be easily swayed by new evidence. Thirdly, there is a 
tendency t o  be cautious, deliberative, to  balance a present 
bit of evidence with other evidence already presented and, 
in some cases, even t o  anticipate the possibility of future 
evidence, Fourthly, there is a determination set up by a pre- 
ceding judgment; this determination, common in some de- 
gree t o  all individuals, is revealed in two ways. (a) A tend- 
ency for all later judgments t o  be influenced by an earIier 
one. This is weakest in those who are easily swayed by new 
evidence, and i t  is strongest in those who reach so high a 
degree of conviction in one direction tha t  subsequent evi- 
dence which might be expected to  move his judgment in t h e  
opposite direction has little weight. (b) A tendency for an 
immediately preceding judgment t o  influence the next one. 
Tha t  is t o  say, no single installment, except the  first, is 
judged in an absolute sense, as if i t  stood alone. Instead, the 
judgment expressed as a degree on the  scale is made relative 
t o  the  preceding judgment. 
There was hardly a testimonial fact tha t  was not judged 
as most significant by one or more persons. For most indi- 
viduals, however, the showing of the  foot t o  the jury and t h e  
absence of any scar was considered the  most significant dis- 
closure in the  trial. Some individuals questioned the absence 
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of the scar on the ground that it had been at  least four years 
since the scar had been seen by any of the witnesses who 
reported it, and consequently it might have disappeared. 
Several Ss were particularly impressed by the testimony that 
Hoag had scars on his forehead and that  the prisoner had 
these scars. Still others regarded the testimony of the judge 
(Coe) as most significant not only on the basis of his charac- 
ter as a judge but also because he was certain in his identifi- 
cation. Some thought that Catherine Secor, who had been 
married to Hoag, could not have been mistaken in her identi- 
fication; others, however, mistrusted her testimony princi- 
pally because of her statement that she had, a t  the time of 
her marriage, "thought him and still thinks him the hand- 
somest man she ever saw." This was considered as flippant. 
Some thought that the Haverstraw witnesses as a whole 
were more reliable, and still others believed the one side as 
creditable as the other. One observer thought the case of the 
prosecution was clinched by the testimony that Hoag was 
identified in New York City after he had left Haverstraw, 
and another thought the case of the defense was clinched by 
the testimony that Parker was known continuously through- 
out the period that Hoag was said t o  have been in Haver- 
straw. Several were particularly impressed by the witness 
who brought his books into the court-room and from them 
testified that  Parker had been on the watch in New York 
City when Hoag was married in Haverstraw. 
We are now in a position to  state what happens in the 
formation of an individual opinion. Under the conditions of 
our experiment in which earlier formed or accepted opinions 
have little influence as compared with political or social 
opinions, the individuals is faced with one or more eviden- 
tiary facts. These facts are then evaluated. This evaluation 
is in part governed by the attitudes or determinations which 
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we have just discussed; and in part by the weight given to  a 
particular bit of testimony. This weight is also influenced by 
such factors as the character of the witness, the relative 
probability of the occurrence of the evidentiary fact, and its 
reasonableness or unreasonableness. Finally, each fact is then 
evaluated in terms of the prisoner's plea. This is much more 
immediate than our analysis would lead us to  suspect. Under 
the general determination to  form an opinion the testimony 
is immediately apprehended as strong or weak and as sig- 
nificant to  a greater or less degree. There is no evidence of a 
reasoning process, a drawing of inferences; the judgment is 
immediate. 
Here I must rest my case. There are, however, three things 
that in conclusion I should like t o  say. First, t o  the members 
of the Bar who may be present. I know perfectly well that 
important aspects of an actual trial are missing. The pre- 
Iiminary statements of counsel, the personalities of the wit- 
nesses, the cross examination, the summing up of counsel, 
and the charge of the judge are all wanting. In  another 
experiment performed in a moot-court with all the procedure 
and furnishings of an acruaI trial, we found that a11 these 
factors are effective in the reaching of a verdict. But they 
influenced the verdict in the same way as did the evidence. 
We found nothing new as regards the mental processes in- 
volved. 
Secondly, on behalf of Dean Wigmore I have not the least 
doubt that his chart method of analysis may be of great 
value to  the young advocate and to  counsel in the determi- 
nation of "proof." Wigmore began by writing a science of 
evidence which would be complementary to  and partly the 
basis for the Rules for Admissibility which he had dealt with 
so faithfully in the Treatise. Instead of limiting himself to 
evidence and the part it plays in proof, he was led into the 
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psychoIogical facts involved in reaching proof, which was a 
mistake. 
Finally, a word to  you my jurors. I fear lest my exposition 
of the way in which you reached your judgments was too 
technical and condensed to  be illuminating. In  particular I 
fear that my talk of attitudes, tendencies, and the like may 
have been meaningless t o  you. Let me add, then, that  just 
as we are creatures of habit in our bodily behavior, so we are 
creatures of habit in our thinking. Behind these habits are 
processes which we call tendencies, attitudes, dispositions. 
We know little of their intimate nature, but we have ample 
evidence of their existence. We think of them as coordina- 
tions and integrations in the nervous system. They are in 
part, like standing erect or using symbols for communica- 
tion, common to a11 men. In  greater part they are acquired in 
the individual's lifetime by learning a t  teacher's knee, or 
from the hard jolts of life, or from some salient experience. 
And because of them we are ready to  act or to  judge when- 
ever we consider our skill as sufficient or our knowledge as 
adequate. Consequently, we do not as a rule reach conclu- 
sions by hesitating and faltering inferences; on the contrary 
we jump to conclusions. 
HARRY P. WELD 
NOTES 
This report of the Thomas Hoag case is taken from Wigmore, T h e  Pr inc ip les  
of Judicial  Proof,  1913: 714-720; 1931: 713-719; T h e  Science of Judiczal Proof,  
1937: 888-896. In the interest of brevity a few unessential sentences of the original 
report are omitted. 
The defense did not contest this marriage. 
8 Installment XI is of course neither testimonial nor circumstantial evidence. It 
is  rather immediate, or direct, or real evidence, or again as Wigmore calls it, 
"Autoptic proference." Since, however, its persuasive value was for the defense we 
have as a matter of convenience included it in the testimony for the defense. 
4 The following statement of results has, with the consent of the American Jour- 
n a l  of Psyclrology, been taken from an article pubIished in that  journal in Vol. 
LI (1938), 609-629. 
